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Abstract 
 
The United States experienced an unprecedented financial crisis after 2007. This paper analyzes 
if retirees had enough wealth built up to weather the financial risks that materialized in the crisis. 
Financial risks associated with saving for retirement had increasingly shifted onto individuals 
away from the public and employers during the decades before the crisis. This growing personal 
responsibility should have gone along with more saving and less risk taking. I use data from the 
Federal Reserve’s triennial Survey of Consumer Finances to first define an income threshold for 
retirees, specifically whether annuity income is greater than twice the poverty line – a common 
proxy for basic income needs. I then calculate the potential retirement income that retirees could 
expect if they translated all of their wealth into income and if the income is adjusted for market, 
idiosyncratic, and longevity risks. I compare the potential risk-adjusted income for retirees with 
annuity income above twice the poverty line to those retirees with annuity income below twice 
the poverty line. Both groups of retirees should have at least the same level of risk-adjusted 
potential retirement income. This comparison shows, however, that retirees with annuity income 
below twice the poverty line did not build up sufficient wealth to compensate for the rising 
financial risk exposure. Public policy thus should maintain existing sources of annuity income, 
promote greater annuitization of financial wealth, and encourage additional savings.  
 
Key words: Retirement income adequacy; personal saving; financial risks  
 
I. Introduction  
The crisis after 2007 created an unprecedented drop in personal wealth. Did retirees have 
enough of a financial cushion to withstand the fallout from the crisis without a drop in living 
standards? Individuals had to take more responsibility for saving for their retirement during the 
decades before the crisis and thus became increasingly exposed to the kind of financial market 
risks that materialized after 2007. On the other hand, the greater risk exposure was meant to give 
individuals an added incentive to save more for retirement. They therefore may have built up 
more of a financial cushion for a potential crisis than they otherwise would have. Household 
wealth after all increased relative to income during the decades before the crisis.  
Most researchers, though, conclude that, despite sharp increases in wealth, a substantial share 
of families were still ill-prepared for retirement and that younger cohorts were increasingly less 
likely to be able to maintain their standard of living in retirement. This apparent contradiction 
between rising wealth and falling retirement income security may result from the fact that 
analyses of retirement income adequacy rely on measures of wealth that are not adjusted for the 
changing risk exposure of individuals over time.  
My analysis thus researches if the shift towards more personal responsibility went along with 
sufficiently larger personal wealth to compensate for the concomitant increase in individual risk 
exposure. I consider the potential retirement income of two groups of retirees: those who receive 
annuities from pensions and Social Security that are at least twice as large as the poverty line and 
are thus have their basic living expenses covered and those who don’t. I look at the potential 
income that both groups of retirees could expect to receive from all sources, including their 
wealth, after adjusting for the risks embedded in their wealth. If the shift towards more personal 
responsibility improved retirement income security, the risk adjusted potential retirement income 
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of retirees with annuity income below twice the poverty line should be at least as large as the 
risk-adjusted potential retirement income of retirees with annuity income above twice the 
poverty line. If this is not the case, the shift towards more personal responsibility has gone along 
with a decline in retirement income security and requires policy attention to boost retirement 
income security after personal wealth has dropped dramatically.  
My research adds to the existing literature in several ways. First, I explicitly account for 
individual risk exposure of retirees in calculating potential retirement income, instead of 
assuming many risks away. Second, I analyze the potential retirement income of current retirees 
instead of forecasting expected retirement income for future retirees, thus eliminating several 
sources of uncertainty about retirement income security. Third, I extend the research on 
retirement income adequacy to include data through 2007 to get a sense of how retirement 
income security changed just before the crisis occurred.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the relevant literature, 
followed by a presentation of some summary statistics in section III. In section IV, I present the 
concept of and data on risk-adjusted potential retirement income. Section V presents the 
multivariate regression analyses for retiree risk exposure, wealth, and income security, followed 
by concluding remarks and a discussion of the policy implications in section VI.  
II. Literature Review  
Retirement income adequacy is commonly defined as a minimum threshold – typically 75-
80% -- of the ratio of potential retirement income from Social Security, pensions, and private 
savings to pre-retirement income (Henle, 1972; Engen, Gale and Uccelo, 1999; RETIRE, 2001). 
The income needs of retirees are likely to be lower than those of workers since they no longer 
need to save for retirement, pay fewer taxes, have no work related expenses, have smaller 
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families, and don’t have a mortgage (Engen, Gale and Uccello, 1999). The target replacement 
rate, though, can vary with pre-retirement income levels and family status (CRR, 2006).  
Most research finds that typically between 35% and 50% of U.S. workers cannot meet the 
replacement rate (Bernheim, 1997; Engen, Gale and Uccello, 1999; Gustman and Steinmeier, 
1999; Moore and Mitchell, 2000; Munnell, Golub-Sass and Webb, 2007; Weller and Wolff, 
2005). Expressed slightly differently, U.S. workers are saving only a fraction – a third or less – 
of what they would need to save for adequate retirement income (Bernheim, 1997; Moore and 
Mitchell, 2000). These findings still hold, when only retirees are considered, instead of 
projecting future retirement income for current workers (Munnell and Soto, 2005;  
An alternative approach to retirement income adequacy is the comparison of expected 
retirement income to an absolute standard, such as the poverty line or twice the poverty line 
(Butrica, Murphy and Zedlewski, 2007; Haveman et al., 2005; Love, Smith and McNair, 2008; 
Weller and Wolff, 2005). For instance, about 30% of near-retiree families in 2001 were expected 
to fall short of having retirement income at least equal to twice the poverty line (Weller and 
Wolff, 2005), which can serve as a proxy for basic living standards (Russell, Bruce and 
Conahan, 2006).  
Studies on retirement income adequacy typically eliminate substantial individual risk 
exposure in their calculations by assuming that retirees will purchase inflation adjusted annuities 
with their private wealth upon retirement.  
Typically, though, retirees do not annuitize their savings (Perun, 2007), which means that the 
risk exposure of retirees has risen over time since the dependence on wealth that is automatically 
annuitized has declined. Fewer private sector workers, for instance, have defined benefit 
pensions and more have defined contribution plans (EBSA, 2008; BLS, 2008).  
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This shift has increasingly exposed retirees to longevity, market, and idiosyncratic risks. 
Longevity risk could be reduced through lifetime annuities, but the vast majority of retirees do 
not annuitize their savings, even when given the chance (Perun, 2007). Moreover, savers can 
only reach a limited protection from market risks through diversification of their assets. And, 
savers may fall prey to idiosyncratic risks. Savers must make contribution, investment, and 
withdrawal choices by themselves in defined contribution plans, with a high chance of making 
the wrong choice (Benartzi and Thaler, 2007; Englehart, 1999; Hurd and Panis, 2006; Mitchell 
and Utkus, 2004; Munnell and Sunden, 2004).  
There is theoretically a positive link between greater risk exposure and more saving. The 
rationale is that individuals save more to build a cushion against the possibility that the growing 
risks will materialize (Browning and Lusardi, 1996; Carroll and Samwick, 1998; Holst, 2005).  
Researchers have similarly analyzed if the shift from defined benefit to defined contribution 
plans has resulted in more saving, but there is no clear conclusion in the literature. Papke (1999) 
concludes that defined contribution plans merely replace defined benefit plans without a net gain 
in personal retirement savings, Engen and Gale (2000) show that there are limited positive 
savings effects for low-income savers, and Benartzi and Thaler (2007) conclude that increases in 
tax incentives resulted in lower contribution rates since savers relied on heuristics rather than 
individual optimization. In comparison, Poterba et al. (2007) and Poterba, Venti, and Wise 
(2007) find a positive effect on personal saving, especially among higher-income earners.  
The growing risk exposure should also have gone along with risk reduction strategies such as 
asset diversification and declining leverage in personal wealth. The data, though, indicate that the 
opposite has been the case. For instance, defined contribution plan participants do not optimally 
diversify across asset classes, often because choices are too complex (Benartzi and Thaler, 2007; 
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Huberman and Jiang, 2006; Iyengar and Kamenica, 2006), they hold a relatively high share of 
their assets in their employer’s stock (Benartzi and Thaler, 2007; Holden et al., 2008; Fidelity 
Investments, 2008), and they only infrequently rebalance their portfolios (Mitchell, Mottola, and 
Utkus, 2005; Reid and Holden, 2008). Furthermore, leverage has generally increased among U.S. 
families (Weller and Sabatini, 2008).  
Shifting the focus from all households to retirees, conclusions on the savings of retirees 
depend on the type of retirement plan they are covered by. Retirees with defined benefit plans 
tend to have more wealth than those with defined contribution plans (Copeland, 2007; Love, 
Smith and McNair, 2007). The risk exposure of retirees also seems to have increased with the 
shift from defined benefit to defined contribution plans (Copeland, 2006; Munnell and Sunden, 
2004; VanDerhei et al., 2008; Weller, 2009). I will thus investigate if savings have increased 
enough, if at all, to compensate for the increasing risk exposure of retirees.  
III. Descriptive Statistics 
My sample comprises retirees 55 years of age and older from the Federal Reserves’ tri-
annual data Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). The SCF includes comprehensive information 
on household wealth for every third year from 1989 to 2007.  
I separate retirees into those who are exposed to more risks and those who are exposed to 
fewer risks. I use the level of annuity income from pensions and Social Security as an indicator 
for the level of risk exposure. Even though Social Security is expected to encounter financial 
shortfalls in the long run, proposals for Social Security reform typically exempt workers and 
retirees 55 and older from any changes. In a similar vein, although pension benefits could 
theoretically change due to an employer’s bankruptcy, benefits are insured, within limits, by the 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). It is thus reasonable to consider pension and 
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Social Security incomes of current retirees as risk free. I then define a household as income 
secure if its annuity income is at least as large as twice the poverty line. Retirees with annuity 
income of at least twice the poverty line should have less wealth and possibly face more risks 
with their wealth than retirees with annuity income below twice the poverty line.  
Table 1 summarizes trends on pension and Social Security income. Only 37.1% of retirees 
had annuity income that was above twice the poverty line in 2007, down from 43.7% in 2004. 
This decline after 2004 likely reflects broader economic trends and suggests that the 
deterioration in income security for retirees may have continued after 2007. The earlier increase 
before 2004 was likely a result of higher Social Security benefits that followed a strong labor 
market in the late 1990s and of solid pension benefits due to an extended stock market run 
(Weller and Wolff, 2005). The decline from 2004 to 2007 similarly may have gone along with 
fewer Social Security benefits due to an especially weak labor market, cuts to Social Security 
benefits for new retirees, starting in 2002, and a wave of pension freezes, following funding 
uncertainty due to large economic, financial market, and legal changes (Munnell et al., 2006).  
Next, Table 1 compares wealth between retirees with annuity income above twice the 
poverty line and those without. I report total wealth relative to income to control for wealth 
differences that occur as a result of different income levels.1 There is no clear trend in 
differences of the wealth to income ratio by the level of annuity income.  
The other side of income security is risk exposure, also shown in Table 1. I use the share of 
equities out of financial assets as indicator of financial asset diversification and debt levels as an 
indicator of leverage. There is again no systematic difference in equity shares and debt levels by 
annuity income levels.  
IV. Income Replacement by Retirees 
                                                 
1 The differences are robust with averages, with all non-retirement wealth, and with non-housing wealth. 
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My primary goal is to estimate the ability of retirees to maintain their standard of living even 
if financial risks materialize. I first calculate the risk-adjusted potential income that retirees could 
expect to generate from their wealth and then compare this potential retirement income to actual 
non-annuity income of retirees.  
My calculation of risk-adjusted potential retirement income captures the spirit of previous 
retirement income adequacy studies since it accounts for all potential sources of retirement 
income, except earnings.2 The differences to previous research, though, are that I consider only 
retirees and thus do not have to forecast wealth to the time of retirement and that I explicitly 
account for the financial risk exposure in private assets instead of assuming it away. The result is 
a more accurate measure of retiree income security.  
All marketable wealth is converted into potential risk-adjusted income. Marketable wealth is 
the sum of housing and non-housing wealth. I first determine the potential risk-adjusted income 
that retirees could receive from their owner-occupied housing. Potential income from living in an 
owner occupied home is typically encapsulated in the user costs of a homeowner, what an 
owner-occupied property would cost in the rental market.3 The basic calculation is defined by: 
)(cos htt
h
tt EiPtuser πγ −+=    (1) 
where P is the current price of the home, i is the mortgage rate, γ is the sum of depreciation, 
maintenance and repair, insurance, and property tax rates, which are all assumed to be constant 
and sum to 7%, and π is the one-year home price appreciation, and E is an expectations operator. 
Data on house values are from the SCF, the mortgage rate is the average annual rate during the 
survey year (BOG, 2009b), and the expected home price appreciation is equal to the average 
                                                 
2 My analysis sets earnings and personal saving to zero, which is common to retirement income adequacy studies. 
3 See Gardner and Verbrugge (2007) for a discussion of the relevant literature, the methodology, and the data.  
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annual growth rate of the Home Price Index from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise 
Oversight (OFHEO, 2009) during the preceding 15 years.  
I also convert non-housing wealth -- non-housing assets minus non-mortgage debt – into 
potential income using a risk free real interest rate. This calculates the amount of annual income 
that retirees could expect from their wealth if the money were invested in risk free assets and 
increased with inflation each year. I use the 10-year average real interest rate for Treasury bonds 
with ten years of maturity for the calculation of the risk-free interest rate and subtract the 10-year 
average inflation rate based on the CPI-U-RS (BLS, 2009). Moreover, I assume that retirees will 
not annuitize their wealth and thus have to plan for their maximum life expectancy instead of the 
average life expectancy as would be the case if all wealth were annuitized. The maximum life 
expectancy is defined as 90 years for households younger than 90 years, 100 years for 
households between the ages of 90 and 99, and 105 years for households over the age of 100. 
The use of a real risk free interest rates accounts for market and idiosyncratic risks, while the use 
of a maximum life expectancy instead of an average life expectancy accounts for longevity risk.  
Total risk-adjusted potential income is the sum of annuity income, transfer income, real user 
costs of homes, and the real potential conversion value of non-housing wealth.4  
Table 2 summarizes the data on risk-adjusted potential retiree income. It shows the total risk-
adjusted potential retiree income and it shows the non-annuity potential retiree income relative to 
discretionary income. I define discretionary as total income minus annuity income. The ratio of 
non-annuity potential income to discretionary income assumes that current income is equal to 
desired income. I thus define income security as maintaining the current level of consumption.  
The data in Table 2 suggest that retirees with annuity incomes above twice the poverty line 
also enjoy greater overall income security than other retirees. The data show that retirees with 
                                                 
4 I assume that annuities and transfer payments will grow with inflation.  
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basic income security have higher risk-adjusted potential incomes than retirees without basic 
income security. This largely reflects the fact that retirees with basic income security tend to 
have more absolute wealth than retirees without basic income security. A substantial minority of 
retirees also were unable to maintain their current level of income, if they also wanted to protect 
themselves from market, idiosyncratic, and longevity risks. Thirty four percent of retirees with 
annuity incomes above twice the poverty line and 51.1% of retirees with less annuity income 
were unable in 2007 to replace their discretionary income with their potential risk-adjusted 
retirement income. Retirees with basic income security are better situated than their counterparts 
to maintain or even increase their current retirement income, although large shortfalls remain.5  
The figures also indicate that there is substantial variability in the level of income security for 
retirees. The last peak of income security was typically 2001 for both groups of retirees. 
Retirement income adequacy thus had fallen even before the crisis occurred and likely left many 
retirees vulnerable to potential reductions in their retirement consumption.  
V. Multivariate analysis 
The descriptive statistics indicate that retirees with annuity income greater than twice the 
poverty level tend to be better positioned to maintain their standard of living throughout their 
retirement than other retirees. Much of this difference is likely explained by demographic 
differences and variation in savings attitudes. I consequently estimate multivariate regressions 
for retirement income security. The dependent variables are the natural logarithm of the total real 
potential income and the difference between risk-adjusted potential income and annuity income 
to discretionary income – the primary income replacement variable of interest in my research. 
The explanatory variables are demographic characteristics – race, family status, income, and age 
– and personal savings characteristics – willingness to take risks and homeownership.  
                                                 
5 This conclusion also holds when total risk-adjusted potential income is related to permanent income.  
 9
In addition, I include an indicator variable for basic income security in the regression 
analyses. It takes the value of “1” if annuity income from pensions and Social Security is at least 
twice as large as the poverty line and “0” otherwise. I alternatively use an indicator variable that 
takes the value of “1” if annuity income is at least as large as the poverty line to test for the 
robustness of my results and the continuous ratio of annuity income relative to total retiree 
income. These variables should have no or a negative systematic effect on the absolute or 
relative retirement income security if families compensate for greater financial risk exposure by 
saving more and investing in more secure assets. A positive coefficient, on the other hand, would 
imply that retirees did not fully compensate for increased financial risk exposure over the 
previous decades and thus likely experienced greater retirement income security during the 
period of financial and economic turmoil after 2007.  
My sample includes retirees 55 years old and older and excludes households with potential 
income that is less than zero or greater than $2 million as well as those with ratios of potential 
income minus annuity income relative to discretionary income that are greater than 700% to 
avoid that the results are influenced by outliers. My results are not sensitive to these restrictions.  
Table 3 summarizes the estimates for the determinants of real risk-adjusted potential income. 
All coefficients have the expected signs or are statistically insignificant. My results show that 
retirement income security tends to be lower for minorities, single women, families with less 
educational attainment than their counterparts, households with lower risk tolerances, and 
renters.  
The important explanatory variable in the regressions presented in Table 3 is the indicator 
variable for annuity income above twice the poverty line. This indicator variable is statistically 
significant and positively related to absolute and relative retirement income security. This 
 10
indicates that retirees with annuity income above twice the poverty line are more likely than 
other retirees to maintain their overall standard of living throughout retirement, even if financial 
risks materialize. This implies that retiree self-insurance has not worked as expected.  
Retirement income security may have deteriorated over time. Older retirees have more risk-
adjusted potential income than younger ones, which could signal that retirement income security 
may deteriorate in the future as retirees who can’t rely as much on annuity income as previous 
cohorts enter retirement. Additionally, the estimates for the real values and for the replacement 
values of discretionary retiree income with annuity income at the poverty level as the threshold 
show that retirement income security in 2007 was below the levels of 2004 and 2001.  
Are the differences in retirement income security for the two groups of retirees due to too 
little wealth, too much risk, or both? The next regressions test the relationship between wealth, 
risks, and annuity income. The wealth regression uses the ratio of total marketable wealth to 
income as the dependent variable.6 The explanatory variables are the same as before. The 
expectation is that the indicator variable for annuity income above twice the poverty line is 
negatively related with total wealth, suggesting that greater risk exposure leads to more wealth.  
The regressions to test for risk reintroduce risks that had been eliminated in the calculations 
before in the calculation of risk-free potential retirement income, specifically longevity, market, 
and idiosyncratic risks. I eliminated longevity risk by assuming that assets will be drawn down 
over a maximum life expectancy. I now reintroduce longevity risk by assuming that retirees will 
draw down their financial wealth over their average life expectancy. I also eliminated market and 
idiosyncratic risks by discounting financial wealth by the risk-free real interest rate and assuming 
that retirees will live in their homes and not sell them. I now allow for market and idiosyncratic 
risk exposure by assuming that retirees will have to generate market rates of return on all of their 
                                                 
6 The results are robust when I use non-housing wealth to income as the dependent variable.  
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wealth. This implies that retirees are selling their homes to pay for their living expenses. The 
market rates of return for equities are the real total rate of return on the S&P 500, the real interest 
rate on the 10-year treasury for non-equity financial wealth, and the real appreciation rate of 
owner-occupied housing based on OFHEO’s House Price Index, all averaged over 15 years.  
The new risky dependent variables follow the model of the earlier dependent variable and are 
set relative to current discretionary income. The indicator variable for annuity income above 
twice the poverty line should have a negative relationship with the potential retirement income 
that allows for longevity or market risk exposure, just as before. Such a negative relationship 
would imply that retirees who have annuity incomes below twice the poverty line also have more 
private wealth, albeit with an increased financial risk exposure than other retirees.  
An important additional aspect of my analysis is the change in the estimated parameter for 
the annuity income indicator. If the estimated difference shrinks after allowing for longevity risk, 
it would imply that retirees with annuity income below twice the poverty line are exposed to 
more longevity risk, largely because they are younger. A similar logic applies to the difference in 
market risk exposure. If retirees with annuity incomes below twice the poverty line are exposed 
to less market risk than other retirees, the reintroduction of market risks should widen the 
estimated gap in risk-exposed retirement income compared to risk-adjusted income. Allowing for 
greater risk exposure than before means that families will have to set aside less money to protect 
themselves from the chance that risks will materialize and thus have more retirement income 
available. This effect is greater for the group of families that faces more risks.  
The first regression in Table 4 shows the estimates for total wealth to income. All variables 
have the expected signs or are statistically insignificant. The results show that retirees with 
annuity income below twice the poverty line have more wealth relative to income, as expected.  
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This difference in wealth, though, is not enough to provide retirees who have annuity income 
below twice the poverty line with the same ability to maintain their standard of living as other 
retirees. The second and third regressions in Table 4 show that retirees with annuity income 
above twice the poverty line still enjoy greater retirement income security. The second 
regression, which allows for longevity risk exposure, shows that allowing for the annuitization of 
financial wealth shrinks the gap between the two groups of retirees. For the average retiree with 
annuity income above twice the poverty line the ratio of risk-adjusted potential retirement 
income minus annuity income to discretionary income is 37.2 percentage points greater than for 
other retirees. The difference shrinks to 21.1 percentage points when I allow for longevity risk 
exposure. Reducing the longevity risk exposure for retirees through annuitization of their 
financial wealth could thus substantially improve retirement income security.  
The third regression shows the estimates after allowing for market and idiosyncratic risk 
exposure. Retirees with annuity incomes above twice the poverty line still enjoy more overall 
retirement income security than other retirees. The policy implication is thus that retirees with 
annuity income below twice the poverty line did not build up enough wealth to compensate for 
their remaining market risk exposure. Moreover, the difference in income security between these 
two groups widens when market risk is allowed, compared to the previous results, suggesting 
that retirees with annuity income above twice the poverty line are more exposed to market risks 
than other retirees, as the fifth regression in Table 4 confirms.  
VI. Conclusion 
In this paper, I analyze income security for U.S. retirees before the crisis in 2008. Retirees 
were expected to become increasingly responsible for saving for retirement and manage the 
concomitant risks on their own. This increased financial risk exposure of individuals should 
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contribute to higher wealth levels in order to compensate for the greater financial risks. Retirees 
who were able to rely less on traditional pensions and Social Security to cover their basic 
expenses indeed accumulated more wealth than those who could not, but not enough to generate 
the same level of retirement income secure and protection from financial market risks. Put 
differently, the basic income security of America’s retirees was already declining before the 
crisis, as traditional pensions became less prevalent, Social Security benefits were gradually 
reduced, and financial risks associated with private savings remained high.  
My results lead to three policy conclusions. First, public policy should help to reduce the risk 
exposure of retirees. My research indicates that greater annuitization of financial wealth can 
make a substantial difference in retirement income security by eliminating longevity risk. Third, 
policymakers should support efforts of families to save more in order to build more of a cushion 
for the eventuality that financial risks materialize as they did in 2007 and thereafter. My results 
indicate that retirees with lower annuities from Social Security and pensions did not compensate 
for this lack of income security by sufficiently saving to compensate for their market risk 
exposure. Second, policymakers should maintain and strengthen retirement savings vehicles that 
offer lifetime annuities to retirees, where feasible. My results show that so far retirees have not 
saved enough and sufficiently reduced financial risks to compensate for the greater individual 
risk exposure in private retirement savings.  
The financial and economic crisis after 2007 exacerbated trends that had existed for decades 
because financial risks materialized after retirees had already become increasingly exposed to 
such risks. Policymakers should focus on improving the balance between personal responsibility 
and secured and guaranteed sources of retirement income.  
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Table 1 
Amounts and Income Shares of Annuitized Retiree Income, 1989 to 2007 
 
  
1989 
 
 
1992 
 
1995 
 
1998 
 
2001 
 
2004 
 
2007 
Median real annuitized income for 
households with annuitized income 
 $18,626  $16,317  $18,001  $18,045  $18,034   $21,428  $20,594 
Median share of annuitized income 
out of total income for households 
with annuitized income 
60.0 60.0 61.5 61.2 59.4 71.4 73.2 
Annuitized income exceeds twice 
the poverty line, all households 
8.8 24.9 25.9 31.2 33.1 43.7 37.1 
Total wealth to income for 
households with annuity income 
above twice the poverty line  
408.0 518.3 535.6 423.9 500.7 578.7 558.7 
Total wealth to income for 
households with annuity income 
below twice the poverty line  
579.3 558.9 437.8 473.1 610.7 404.1 472.1 
Equities out of financial assets for 
households with financial 
investments and annuity income 
above twice the poverty line  
28.1 22.3 26.8 42.3 53.3 48.3 33.8 
Equities out of financial assets for 
households with financial 
investments and with annuity 
income below the poverty line  
26.7 28.6 41.2 42.0 52.0 41.7 42.9 
Median debt to income for retirees 
with debt and with annuity income 
above twice the poverty line 
28.8 31.0 21.4 46.5 43.9 41.5 46.6 
Median debt to income for retirees 
with debt and with annuity income 
below twice the poverty line 
 
27.4 22.0 33.2 44.8 32.4 59.9 77.6 
 
Notes: Due to the survey design, shares of income can theoretically be greater than 100%, but are capped at 100%. 
All financial variables reference the entire household. All figures are in percent, unless otherwise specified.  
 
 15
 16
Table 2 
Summary Data on Retirement Income Security, 1989 to 2007 
 
  
1989 
 
 
1992 
 
1995 
 
1998 
 
2001 
 
2004 
 
2007 
Real risk-adjusted potential income 
of retirees with annuity income 
above twice the poverty line  
 $58,398  $61,032  $67,573  $63,459  $76,502   $76,215  $70,830 
Real risk-adjusted potential income 
of retirees with annuity incomes 
below twice the poverty line  
 $32,553  $24,698  $25,981  $27,768  $28,227   $26,929  $30,249 
Risk-adjusted potential income 
minus annuity income relative to 
discretionary income for retirees 
with annuity income above twice 
the poverty line 
102.0 122.6 129.8 132.3 136.3 131.4 118.2 
Risk-adjusted potential income 
minus annuity income relative to 
discretionary income for retirees 
with annuity income below twice 
the poverty line  
98.9 83.3 80.2 86.9 96.8 96.4 99.3 
Share of retirees with annuity 
income above twice the poverty line 
whose potential income minus 
annuity income is smaller than their 
discretionary income.  
48.7 33.2 30.8 30.7 27.7 30.0 34.5 
Share of retirees with annuity 
income below twice the poverty line 
whose potential income minus 
annuity income is smaller than their 
discretionary income.  
51.4 58.1 57.4 55.6 53.3 54.2 51.0 
 
Notes: All figures are in percent, unless otherwise noted. Absolute and relative risk-adjusted real amounts of 
potential income are medians. Shares of households are averages.  
 
Table 3 
Regression Results for Determinants of Potential Income, 1989 to 2007 
 
Variable Dependent variable: real potential income (natural 
logarithm) 
Dependent variable: potential income minus annuity 
income to discretionary income 
 Annuity 
income above 
twice the 
poverty line 
Annuity 
income above 
the poverty line 
Annuity 
income as share 
of total income 
Annuity 
income above 
twice the 
poverty line 
Annuity 
income above 
the poverty line 
Annuity 
income as share 
of total income 
Black -0.304*** 
(0.046) 
-0.230*** 
(0.048) 
-0.352*** 
(0.050) 
-0.228*** 
(0.049) 
-0.181*** 
(0.052) 
-0.304*** 
(0.048) 
Hispanic -0.360*** 
(0.101) 
-0.344*** 
(0.097) 
-0.434*** 
(0.103) 
-0.140 
(0.108) 
-0.131 
(0.108) 
-0.191* 
(0.105) 
Other race -0.233 
(3.317) 
-0.222 
(3.317) 
-0.274 
(3.317) 
-0.013 
(3.318) 
-0.007 
(3.318) 
-0.090 
(3.317) 
Less than high school -0.796*** 
(0.039) 
-0.869*** 
(0.038) 
-0.953*** 
(0.041) 
-0.201*** 
(0.064) 
-0.251*** 
(0.061) 
-0.391*** 
(0.060) 
High school -0.484*** 
(0.033) 
-0.566*** 
(0.033) 
-0.592*** 
(0.035) 
-0.041 
(0.051) 
-0.097** 
(0.048) 
-0.160*** 
(0.046) 
Some college -0.260*** 
(0.041) 
-0.320*** 
(0.042) 
-0.314*** 
(0.044) 
-0.006 
(0.068) 
-0.046 
(0.066) 
-0.083 
(0.063) 
Single women -0.149*** 
(0.043) 
-0.193*** 
(0.042) 
-0.249*** 
(0.045) 
-0.169** 
(0.078) 
-0.199** 
(0.080) 
-0.210*** 
(0.079) 
Married 0.306*** 
(0.044) 
0.333*** 
(0.042) 
0.270*** 
(0.045) 
-0.117 
(0.077) 
-0.100 
(0.079) 
-0.079 
(0.079) 
Age 0.077*** 
(0.030) 
0.061* 
(0.031) 
0.109*** 
(0.032) 
-0.012 
(0.040) 
0.022 
(0.039) 
-0.073* 
(0.039) 
Age2 -0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0003 
(0.0002) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0003 
(0.0003) 
0.0002 
(0.0003) 
0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
Homeowner 0.657*** 
(0.072) 
0.644*** 
(0.070) 
0.680*** 
(0.075) 
0.039 
(0.100) 
0.030 
(0.100) 
-0.055 
(0.099) 
Risk attitude -0.202*** 
(0.021) 
-0.227*** 
(0.022) 
-0.240*** 
(0.023) 
-0.066** 
(0.032) 
-0.083*** 
(0.032) 
-0.150*** 
(0.030) 
Has annuity income above twice the 
poverty line 
0.558*** 
(0.025) 
  0.372*** 
(0.051) 
  
Has annuity income above the poverty line  0.510*** 
(0.031) 
  0.331*** 
(0.032) 
 
Annuity income as share of total income   0.033 
(0.046) 
  0.825*** 
(0.080) 
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1992 -0.273*** 
(0.052) 
-0.372*** 
(0.055) 
-0.183*** 
(0.053) 
-0.139** 
(0.069) 
-0.202*** 
(0.070) 
-0.073 
(0.067) 
1995 -0.293*** 
(0.056) 
-0.394*** 
(0.057) 
-0.213*** 
(0.056) 
-0.139** 
(0.071) 
-0.204*** 
(0.070) 
-0.096 
(0.066) 
1998 -0.213*** 
(0.051) 
-0.287*** 
(0.055) 
-0.093* 
(0.053) 
-0.051 
(0.082) 
-0.098 
(0.080) 
0.031 
(0.074) 
2001 -0.113** 
(0.050) 
-0.219*** 
(0.055) 
0.010 
(0.051) 
-0.052 
(0.077) 
-0.119 
(0.075) 
-0.004 
(0.070) 
2004 -0.139*** 
(0.050) 
-0.208*** 
(0.053) 
0.038 
(0.051) 
-0.105 
(0.078) 
-0.146* 
(0.079) 
-0.056 
(0.076) 
2007 -0.146*** 
(0.055) 
-0.234*** 
(0.059) 
-0.002 
(0.055) 
-0.107 
(0.070) 
-0.162** 
(0.070) 
-0.068 
(0.066) 
Constant 7.755*** 
(1.129) 
4.921*** 
(1.194) 
6.869*** 
(1.201) 
0.598 
(1.414) 
1.051 
(1.371) 
3.049** 
(1.378) 
       
N 3497 3497 3497 3497 3497 3497 
Adjusted R-squared 
 
0.517 0.513 0.424 0.148 0.138 0.221 
 
Notes: All demographic variables refer to the head of household. Risk attitude measures a household’s willingness to take financial risks on a four-point scale, 
where a lower number indicates a greater willingness to take financial risks. Regression results derive from a population-weighted regression. The results are 
robust for unweighted regressions. Missing reference variables are “white”, “college”, “single men”, “renter”, and “1989”. *** indicates significance at the 1%-
level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-level, and *** indicates significance at the 10%-level.  
 
Table 4 
Regression Estimates for Market Risk and Marketable Wealth for Retirees, 1989 to 2007 
 
Explanatory variables Wealth to 
income 
Potential income 
minus annuity 
income to 
discretionary 
income, with 
longevity risk 
exposure 
Potential income 
minus annuity 
income to 
discretionary 
income, with 
market risk 
exposure 
Potential income 
minus annuity 
income to 
discretionary 
income, with 
market and 
longevity risk 
exposure 
Equity out of 
financial assets 
Houses out of 
total assets 
Real income (natural 
logarithm) 
- - - - 0.108*** 
(0.020) 
-0.124*** 
(0.009) 
Black -2.215*** 
(0.768) 
-0.056* 
(0.032) 
-0.275*** 
(0.051) 
-0.117*** 
(0.036) 
0.020 
(0.067) 
0.133*** 
(0.030) 
Hispanic -3.122*** 
(0.778) 
-0.017 
(0.065) 
-0.182 
(0.114) 
-0.070 
(0.072) 
-0.099 
(0.120) 
0.073 
(0.047) 
Other race -1.114 
(3.333) 
0.059 
(3.316) 
0.045 
(3.318) 
0.136 
(3.317) 
-0.180 
(3.317) 
0.029 
(3.316) 
Less than high school -4.266*** 
(0.633) 
-0.008 
(0.032) 
-0.285*** 
(0.069) 
-0.120*** 
(0.040) 
-0.219*** 
(0.041) 
0.090*** 
(0.021) 
High school -2.707*** 
(0.595) 
0.015 
(0.027) 
-0.106* 
(0.057) 
-0.071** 
(0.036) 
-0.182*** 
(0.031) 
0.041** 
(0.017) 
Some college -1.825** 
(0.683) 
0.030 
(0.033) 
-0.051 
(0.074) 
-0.035 
(0.043) 
-0.089** 
(0.036) 
0.020 
(0.020) 
Single women -0.622 
(0.662) 
-0.069* 
(0.038) 
-0.188** 
(0.082) 
-0.092** 
(0.045) 
-0.029 
(0.048) 
0.021 
(0.027) 
Married -0.370 
(0.620) 
-0.126*** 
(0.037) 
-0.109 
(0.082) 
-0.113** 
(0.045) 
-0.003 
(0.044) 
0.078*** 
(0.023) 
Age -0.309 
(0.336) 
0.094*** 
(0.018) 
-0.006 
(0.043) 
0.109*** 
(0.023) 
0.027 
(0.023) 
-0.019 
(0.014) 
Age2 -0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0003 
(0.0003) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
Risk attitude -1.528*** 
(0.342) 
0.009 
(0.016) 
-0.142*** 
(0.036) 
-0.093*** 
(0.023) 
-0.222*** 
(0.020) 
0.060*** 
(0.011) 
Home ownership  0.454*** 
(0.045) 
-0.033 
(0.112) 
0.358*** 
(0.066) 
  
Has annuity income 
above twice the poverty 
-3.191*** 
(0.468) 
0.211*** 
(0.025) 
0.403 
(0.057) 
0.254*** 
(0.033) 
-0.036 
(0.027) 
0.031** 
(0.014) 
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line 
1992 1.348 
(0.675) 
-0.039 
(0.041) 
-0.137* 
(0.072) 
-0.038 
(0.045) 
0.072 
(0.053) 
0.040 
(0.026) 
1995 0.619 
(0.656) 
-0.059 
(0.040) 
-0.105 
(0.075) 
-0.015 
(0.047) 
0.091 
(0.053) 
0.011 
(0.026) 
1998 0.967* 
(0.556) 
-0.062 
(0.043) 
0.053 
(0.088) 
0.068 
(0.053) 
0.132** 
(0.053) 
0.011 
(0.045) 
2001 2.013*** 
(0.525) 
-0.039 
(0.041) 
0.031 
(0.083) 
0.075 
(0.051) 
0.172*** 
(0.052) 
0.045* 
(0.027) 
2004 2.296*** 
(0.787) 
-0.088** 
(0.039) 
-0.068 
(0.083) 
-0.036 
(0.046) 
0.123** 
(0.050) 
0.096*** 
(0.027) 
2007 2.977*** 
(0.672) 
-0.119*** 
(0.037) 
-0.068 
(0.073) 
-0.064 
(0.041) 
0.157*** 
(0.051) 
0.106*** 
(0.026) 
Constant 2.866 
(12.217) 
-3.149*** 
(0.641) 
0.846 
(1.527) 
-3.109*** 
(0.850) 
-1.244 
(0.883) 
2.225*** 
(0.509) 
       
N 3497 3497 3497 3497 3497 3497 
F-statistics 103.16***      
Adjusted R-squared 
 
0.095 0.104 0.137 0.099 0.182 0.349 
 
Notes: Risk regressions are censored regressions. All demographic variables refer to the head of household. Risk attitude measures a household’s willingness to 
take financial risks on a four-point scale, where a lower number indicates a greater willingness to take financial risks. Regression results derive from a 
population-weighted regression. The results are robust for unweighted regressions. Missing reference variables are “white”, “college”, “single men”, “renter”, 
and “1989”. *** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-level, and *** indicates significance at the 10%-level.  
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